Atacs Corp v. Trans World Comm Inc by unknown
1998 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
9-8-1998 
Atacs Corp v. Trans World Comm Inc 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1998 
Recommended Citation 
"Atacs Corp v. Trans World Comm Inc" (1998). 1998 Decisions. 217. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1998/217 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 1998 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
Filed September 8, 1998 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
Nos. 97-1812 & 97-1813 
 
ATACS CORPORATION; AIRTACS CORPORATION, 
 
       Appellants in 97-1812 
 
v. 
 
TRANS WORLD COMMUNICATIONS, INC., 
 
       Appellant in 97-1813 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 92-cv-05064) 
 
Argued: June 5, 1998 
 
Before: SCIRICA, NYGAARD and SEITZ, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: September 8, 1998) 
 
       Mark A. Dombroff (Argued) 
       Courtney R. Bateman 
       DOMBROFF & GILMORE 
       1025 Thomas Jefferson Street, NW 
       Suite 300 West 
       Washington, DC 20007 
       Attorneys for Appellants/Cross 
       Appellees 
 
 
  
       Barbara W. Mather (Argued) 
       Robert L. Hickcok 
       L. Suzanne Forbis 
       Matthew J. Hamilton 
       PEPPER HAMILTON LLP 
       3000 Two Logan Square 
       Eighteenth & Arch Streets 
       Philadelphia, PA 19103-2799 
       Attorneys for Appellee/Cross 
       Appellant 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SEITZ, Circuit Judge. 
 
This appeal and cross-appeal primarily present two novel 
issues for review. The first question is whether the parties 
entered into a legally enforceable "teaming agreement." If 
the answer is in the affirmative, we must address how to 
calculate, if at all possible, the damage resulting from a 
breach of that agreement. The district court exercised 
diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1332, and our 
jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. S 1291 to consider the 
district court's final orders. The parties agree that the 
substantive contract law of Pennsylvania governs the issues 
raised in this case. 
 
I. Factual Background 
 
A. The Parties and Related Entities 
 
For the most part, the parties do not dispute the relevant 
facts as described by the district court in its detailed 
findings of fact set forth on May 28, 1997 after a bench 
trial. To summarize, ATACS Corporation and AIRTACS 
Corporation ("plaintiffs") engaged in the business of 
integrating or customizing mobile enclosures with 
communications or other equipment for military use. Trans 
World Communications ("defendant") is a subsidiary of 
Datron, Inc., a publicly traded company. Defendant engages 
in designing, manufacturing, and selling of high frequency 
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radio equipment into communications shelters and for 
other uses. 
 
B. The Greek Request for Proposal and 
the Parties' Agreements 
 
The history underlying the transactions subject to 
dispute in this case begins in October of 1989, when the 
Greek government opened bidding to manufacture 61 
communication shelters for the Hellenic Army General 
Staff. A Request for Proposal ("RFP") prepared by the Greek 
government outlined various specifications for the 
communications shelters as well as certain financial 
requirements for all bidders. Plaintiffs considered bidding 
on the contract as the prime contractor, but they lacked the 
requisite assets to meet the financial obligations 
enumerated in the Greek RFP. Defendant also investigated 
bidding on the project as prime contractor, but it did not 
command significant technical experience in this particular 
field and generally lacked foreign government contracting 
knowledge to bid and perform the contract on its own. 
 
Given the comparative strengths of the parties, a 
strategic alliance was born on February 26, 1990, where 
defendant wrote plaintiffs stating that "[t]his letter will serve 
as confirmation that Trans World Communications intends 
to team with ATACS Corporation on the Greek Shelter 
program." App. at 1671. While defendant professed that the 
"details need[ed] to be worked out," and that "this [letter] is 
only a preliminary look at our various responsibilities," 
defendant sought a commitment from plaintiffs before any 
quotations were issued. Id. Further discussions proved 
fruitful, and the parties agreed that defendant would bid for 
the Greek RFP as the prime contractor and plaintiffs would 
be the major subcontractor. App. at 1913. By April 25, 
1990, defendant communicated to plaintiffs a basic outline 
for the new arrangement whereby defendant agreed to 
assume the role of prime contractor, assume complete 
responsibility for the financial requirements of the Greek 
RFP, and give plaintiffs a subcontract for the shelter and 
generator systems. In return, plaintiffs were expected to 
"assist in the final proposal preparation," submit a price 
quotation on their portion of the program, and introduce 
 
                                3 
  
defendant to their Greek agent who would facilitate the bid. 
App. at 1913. The parties agreed to circulate a draft 
contract and initiate the process of formalizing this 
agreement. 
 
For the next three months, the parties circulated draft 
subcontracts, none of which were executed. In the 
exchange of drafts, however, the parties had substantially 
agreed to the basic understanding of the transaction. In 
particular, the parties agreed that: 
 
       1. Transworld will be the Prime Contractor and will 
       assume complete responsibility for the Program 
       including any Letters of Credit which may be 
       required. ATACS will be a sub-contractor to 
       Transworld and will be responsible for the shelters 
       and generators.1 
 
       2. Axon Inc. will be the sole agent for this program. 
       ATACS will introduce Transworld to Axon May 1, 
       1990 . . . .2 
 
       3. ATACS has accomplished significant work 
       developing a Technical Proposal. In addition, 
       ATACS has also reviewed the agent's Consulting 
       Agreement and the Offset Agreement. This 
       information will be made available to Transworld. 
       Transworld will reimburse ATACS for their cost 
       associated with our Technical Proposal and for 
       legal expenses associated with the review of Offsets 
       and Consulting Agreements.3 
 
       4. ATACS will submit a quotation to Transworld for 
       the shelters and generators. It is agreed that 
       Transworld will flow down to ATACS no less 
       favorable payment terms and conditions than it 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The later documentation reflects that the parties had agreed to give 
defendant an option to purchase the generators directly. Defendant 
exercised this option and accordingly plaintiffs' eventual proposal did 
not 
include generators. 
 
2. Axon Inc. is plaintiffs' agent in Greece that would facilitate 
defendant's 
bid for the Greek RFP. 
 
3. The parties agreed that any reimbursement for ATACS' services under 
this provision would be built into the proposal submitted to defendant. 
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       receives from the Greek Government. ATACS will in 
       turn flow down these same terms and conditions to 
       its Prime vendors. 
 
       5. ATACS agrees to work exclusively with Transworld 
       on this project. Transworld agrees to work 
       exclusively with ATACS relative to the ATACS 
       Scope of Work set forth in paragraph 1 above. 
 
       . . . . 
 
       7. ATACS agrees to assist Transworld as needed in 
       the final proposal preparation. 
 
App. at 1914-15; see also App. at 1948-49, 1966-69, 2047- 
50, 2059-62. In accordance with their understanding, 
plaintiffs introduced defendant to their Greek agent who 
ultimately proved to be influential in getting defendant the 
final contract. 
 
After more draft subcontracts and price quotations, none 
of which were executed by the parties, plaintiffs submitted 
their final price proposal to defendant, which totaled 
approximately $3.8 million. On July 16, defendant 
submitted its own proposal to the Greek government. As 
the prime contractor bidding for the Greek RFP, defendant 
represented that plaintiffs would be "the primary 
subcontractor in our proposal," as well as a member of the 
"team" working on the project. App. at 2144-45. It is not 
disputed on appeal that defendant included in its bid 
plaintiffs' final prices plus a 30% profit margin. 
 
C. Post-Submission Conduct 
 
Several months after the submission of the bid for the 
Greek RFP, defendant learned that its proposal for the 
project remained competitive. Nevertheless, in early 
December of 1990, defendant contacted Craig Systems 
("Craig"), a manufacturer of bare shelters, shelter 
integrator, and competitor to plaintiffs. When Craig 
expressed an interest in performing the shelter integration 
work on the Greek project -- the same work that had been 
promised to plaintiffs -- defendant sent to Craig all of the 
information, design notes, general correspondence, and 
plaintiffs' technical proposal regarding the Greek RFP. 
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Defendant then asked Craig to submit a bid for the shelter 
work, and Craig ultimately submitted its final proposal and 
price quotation in late January of 1991. 
 
On January 24, 1991, plaintiffs' Greek agent forwarded 
defendant the results of the Greek government's review of 
the various bids, which indicated that the defendant's bid 
was the lowest among the competitors. Although defendant 
at this point was confident that it would win the contract, 
it realized that the final award would require further 
negotiations with the Greek government.4  For the next 
several months, defendant negotiated with Greek 
authorities to determine the final technical specifications 
and price concessions. Then, on May 13, 1991, defendant 
sent all its potential subcontractors, including plaintiffs, a 
form letter which stated: 
 
       We have recently been called by the Greek government 
       to negotiate the final terms and conditions for this 
       shelter contract. Therefore, we ask that your firm 
       please REQUOTE YOUR OFFER to us as soon as 
       possible, and extend the quote validity date to at least 
       August 31, 1991. 
 
       . . . 
 
       . . . All outside vendor equipment and service is being 
       bid in a competitive environment and Trans World will 
       chose the supplier, based on the price of goods, 
       quality, service and technical/manufacturing 
       capabilities. 
 
App. at 2413 (emphasis in original). On the same date, 
defendant sent plaintiffs another letter which,"encourage[d] 
you to make your bid as competitive as possible. While we 
were encouraged in our earlier preliminary discussions by 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Apparently, negotiations between the government and contractors even 
after the unsealing of the bids are typical in thisfield of government 
contracting. See Air Tech. Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 199 N.E.2d 538, 
543 (Mass. 1964); Brent E. Newton, Note, The Legal Effect of Government 
Contractor Teaming Agreements: A Proposal for Determining Liability and 
Assessing Damages in Event of Breach, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 1990, 1995 
n.25 (1991); W. Noel Keyes, Government Contracts in a Nutshell 137-69 
(2d ed. 1990). 
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the cost estimates you provided us for planning purposes, 
your later formal proposal was disappointingly high and 
was not competitive with other proposals which we have 
received." App. at 2412. This letter was thefirst 
communication to plaintiffs by defendant indicating that 
defendant had in fact been soliciting other proposals for the 
shelter integration and air conditioning portions of the 
project. It was also the first time plaintiffs had learned that 
defendant considered plaintiffs' proposal "disappointingly 
high," even though defendant's bid for the Greek RFP was 
the lowest of all bidders. 
 
Shocked at defendant's position, plaintiffs responded to 
these letters by confirming the validity of their price 
proposals submitted on June 28, 1990. Although plaintiffs 
indicated that they were "not and never have been unwilling 
to discuss with you an equitable adjustment to our 
proposed pricing if such an adjustment is required in 
obtaining the award," App. at 2432, they emphasized that 
"[t]here was an agreement between Trans World and ATACS 
that ATACS would be the sole source shelter integrator and 
supplier, and . . . AIRTACS [would be the] sole source 
provider of air conditioners . . . ." App. at 2414. Defendant 
did not respond to plaintiffs' letters or other attempts at 
communication. 
 
By December 11, 1991, defendant completed negotiations 
with the Greek government and executed a contract in the 
amount of $23,006,319, which closely corresponded to the 
original bid from defendant, absent minor adjustments to 
hardware, training, and technical specifications. Nearly a 
month later, defendant sent another letter to potential 
subcontractors, including plaintiffs, explaining the 
technical changes and requesting an updated quote on the 
revised shelter design specifications. While plaintiffs did not 
respond, defendant received quotations from three other 
companies, including Craig, for the shelter integration 
work. These proposals quoted prices significantly lower 
than plaintiffs' final price quote, and included proposals for 
bare shelters, which was not included in the plaintiffs' 
package. Defendant ultimately executed subcontracts with 
Craig for the shelter integration work and Airflow for the air 
conditioner portion of the project. The total price difference 
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between the Craig/Airflow contracts and the plaintiffs' 
proposals totaled $1,887,104. 
 
D. The District Court's Disposition 
 
In response to these events, plaintiffs sued defendant in 
the district court, alleging breach of contract, detrimental 
reliance, misrepresentation, wrongful interference with 
prospective contractual relations, and unjust enrichment. 
After a bench trial, the district court found that the 
"teaming arrangement" between defendant and plaintiffs 
constituted an enforceable contract with sufficiently definite 
terms for enforcement, notwithstanding the absence of a 
final executed document evincing the parties' agreement. 
The district court relied on the outward manifestation of the 
parties' intent to conclude that the terms of the legally 
binding agreement between defendant and plaintiffs 
entailed a promise by defendant to work exclusively with 
plaintiffs in its bid for the Greek RFP, and to further 
negotiate in good faith the final subcontract prices if the 
Greek government awarded defendant the prime contract. 
In return, plaintiffs promised defendant to assist in the 
preparation of its bid, to work exclusively with defendant, 
and to introduce defendant to its Greek contacts. The 
district court further found that the parties did not agree 
on the price of the subcontract, nor did they come to an 
agreement regarding any fees plaintiffs would receive for 
their services. 
 
Given these terms of the contract, the district court 
found defendant in breach of contract when it did not work 
exclusively with plaintiffs in arriving at a final price 
agreement for the subcontract. Moreover, the court found 
that defendant's conduct after the Greek government 
awarded it the project did not constitute good faith 
negotiations with plaintiffs. This, the could held, also 
constituted a breach of the teaming agreement between the 
parties. 
 
Accordingly, the district court next considered what form 
of damages would appropriately compensate plaintiffs. 
While the district court recognized that expectation 
damages, measured in lost profits, ordinarily applies under 
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Pennsylvania law, it found that such a calculation, if 
attempted, would lead to mere speculation because the 
parties never agreed on a price for plaintiffs' subcontract. 
Similarly, the district court felt unable to compute lost 
opportunity damages because the plaintiffs had not 
submitted sufficient evidence showing that the parties 
would have come to an agreement on price given the 
different positions on various financing fees, and the 
enormous difference between plaintiffs' final price and the 
ultimate bid submitted by Craig. It therefore held that 
plaintiffs could not receive lost profits as a remedy for 
breach of contract. 
 
Next, the district court considered whether restitution or 
reliance damages were appropriate, and submitted the 
question to the parties for further briefing. With respect to 
restitution, plaintiffs argued that the value of its services 
rendered to defendant roughly approximate the $1,288,349 
defendant had paid in consulting fees to plaintiffs' Greek 
agent. The district court rejected that argument because it 
found the consulting services provided by plaintiffs' own 
Greek agent differed substantially from the technical 
services provided by plaintiffs. Because the district court 
felt that it had no reasonable basis in calculating the value 
of plaintiffs' service and assistance rendered to defendant, 
it rejected a restitutionary theory as a basis for damages 
and entered into judgment nominal damages of only $1. 
 
Plaintiffs appeal the district court's calculation of 
damages at $1. Defendant cross-appeals the district court's 
findings to the extent it found the teaming agreement an 
enforceable contract under Pennsylvania law. We address 
these issues in turn. 
 
II. Was There a Valid and Enforceable Contract? 
 
The first issue, raised in defendant's cross-appeal, is 
whether there existed a valid and enforceable contract 
between the parties. Defendant argues on appeal that any 
agreement intended between the parties cannot, as a 
matter of law, constitute an enforceable contract because of 
the failure to agree on essential terms of the contract. In 
particular, defendant emphasizes that the parties never 
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reached a final agreement on the price of plaintiffs' 
subcontract and the absence of such a term must prove 
fatal to contract formation. Defendant further asserts that 
the teaming agreement at issue in this case is aptly 
characterized, at best, as an "agreement to agree," which is 
incapable of enforcement under Pennsylvania law. 
 
Plaintiffs dispute defendant's analysis and vigorously 
maintain that the agreement between the parties 
constituted a valid and enforceable contract. Here, plaintiffs 
assert that defendant's conduct through the negotiation of 
subcontracts demonstrates an acceptance of their price 
officer, and therefore the agreement cannot fail for lack of 
definiteness. Moreover, plaintiffs contend that regardless of 
the pricing terms of the subcontract, defendant breached 
its agreement to work exclusively with them in negotiating 
a subcontract and this constituted a breach of the teaming 
arrangement which itself is a binding agreement. 
 
This issue of contract formation invokes a mixed 
standard of appellate review. The district court's factual 
findings, especially with respect to the parties' intentions, 
will not be reversed unless the record demonstrates that 
they are clearly erroneous. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a). 
Similarly, the interpretation of contractual language to 
discern contractual intent is a factual question, which we 
will accordingly review under a clearly erroneous standard. 
See Painewebber Inc. v. Hartmann, 921 F.2d 507, 510 (3d 
Cir. 1990). Conclusions drawn with respect to the legal 
effect of any agreement, however, are questions of law and 
therefore subject to plenary review. See Linder v. Inhalation 
Therapy Servs., Inc., 834 F.2d 306, 310 (3d Cir. 1987). 
 
A. Elements of Contract Formation and 
Teaming Agreements  
 
It is by now hornbook law that "the test for enforceability 
of an agreement is whether both parties have manifested an 
intention to be bound by its terms and whether the terms 
are sufficiently definite to be specifically enforced." Channel 
Home Ctrs. v. Grossman, 795 F.2d 291, 298-99 (3d Cir. 
1986) (citing Lombardo v. Gasparini Excavating Co., 123 
A.2d 663, 666 (Pa. 1956); Linnet v. Hitchcock, 471 A.2d 
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537, 540 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984)). Consideration is, of course, 
a required element of contract formation. Id. at 299. While 
typically analyzed in terms of offer and acceptance, see 1 
Arthur L. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts S 12, at 27 (1963), 
the decisive inquiry in contract formation is the 
"manifestation of assent of the parties to the terms of the 
promise and to the consideration for it . . . ." 1 Samuel 
Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts S 23, at 51 
(Walter H. E. Jaeger ed., 3d ed. 1957); Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts S 22 (1981) ("Restatement"). Thus, 
applying Pennsylvania law, we look to: (1) whether both 
parties manifested an intention to be bound by the 
agreement; (2) whether the terms of the agreement are 
sufficiently definite to be enforced; and (3) whether there 
was consideration. See Channel Home Ctrs., 795 F.2d at 
299; Johnston the Florist, Inc. v. Tedco Constr. Corp., 657 
A.2d 511, 516 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995). 
 
In the attempt to ascertain the outward manifestation of 
intention expressed by the parties, it is often helpful to 
consider the general usage or custom prevailing in a given 
market. See 5 Samuel Williston, supra, S 648, at 1-2 nn.1- 
2. We therefore consider "teaming agreements," as that 
term is normally understood within the context of 
government contracting. Typically, a teaming agreement is 
an arrangement whereby a subcontractor will "team" with a 
company intending to bid on a government contract as a 
prime contractor in order to pool financial and technical 
resources. See Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 
705 F.2d 1030, 1037 n.1 (9th Cir. 1983); Experimental 
Eng'g v. United Tech. Corp., 614 F.2d 1244, 1245 (9th Cir. 
1980); Air Tech. v. General Elec. Co., 199 N.E.2d 538, 547 
(Mass. 1964); see also Colsa Corp. v. Martin Marietta Servs., 
Inc., 133 F.3d 853, 854 (11th Cir. 1998). The subcontractor 
would ordinarily provide technical expertise and assist in 
the prime contractor's bid submission in return for the 
prime contractor's promise to award the subcontract. 
Parties to such a teaming agreement benefit from the 
arrangement not only as a means of sharing resources, but 
also as a hedge against the many uncertainties involved in 
government contracting. 
 
In many cases, the finalized subcontract between the 
parties to a teaming agreement will specifically enumerate 
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the scope of obligations for each party contingent upon the 
prime contractor winning the RFP so that there is usually 
little need to enforce the teaming arrangement itself. Often, 
however, the parties may reach an understanding to team, 
but fail to execute a subcontract as anticipated in the 
teaming agreement. See McDonnell Douglas, 705 F.2d at 
1037; Experimental Eng'g, 614 F.2d at 1245; Air Tech., 199 
N.E.2d at 548. As with most other "preliminary agreements" 
precedent to an executed contract, see generally  E. Allan 
Farnsworth, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary 
Agreements: Fair Dealing and Failed Negotiations, 87 
Colum. L. Rev. 217 (1987), the question arises whether the 
teaming agreement itself, absent an executed subcontract, 
may constitute the basis for contractual liability. Courts 
have generally allowed such a cause of action in contract 
based solely on the teaming agreement, see Brent E. 
Newton, Note, The Legal Effect of Government Contracting 
Teaming Agreements: A Proposal for Determining Liability 
and Assessing Damages in Event of Breach, 91 Colum. L. 
Rev. 1990, 2010-13 (1991) (collecting cases), but not 
without overcoming two major obstacles: (1) the intent of 
the parties to enter into a binding contractual relationship; 
and (2) the existence of sufficiently objective criteria to 
enforce. See, e.g., Allen & Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 
382 F. Supp. 1052, 1057 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd, 519 F.2d 
788 (2d Cir. 1975). 
 
These two factors for consideration closely track the 
general elements of contract formation. For instance, it is 
well established that evidence of preliminary negotiations or 
a general agreement to enter a binding contract in the 
future fail as enforceable contracts because the parties 
themselves have not come to an agreement on the essential 
terms of the bargain and therefore there is nothing for the 
court to enforce. See Goldman v. McShain, 247 A.2d 455, 
458 (Pa. 1968); Reich v. Vegex, Inc., 51 F. Supp. 99, 103 
(E.D. Pa. 1942) (applying Pennsylvania law); 1 Joseph M. 
Perillo, Corbin on Contracts S 2.8(a), at 131-34 (Rev. ed. 
1993). Conversely, it is equally well established in contract 
law that an agreement with open terms may nevertheless 
constitute an enforceable contract. See Carlos R. Leffler, 
Inc. v. Hutter, 696 A.2d 157, 163 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997); 1 
Joseph M. Perillo, supra, S 2.8, at 138-39; cf. Uniform 
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Commercial Code S 2-311(1) ("An agreement for sale which 
is otherwise sufficiently definite . . . to be a contract is not 
made invalid by the fact that it leaves particulars of 
performance to be specified by one the parties."). With 
teaming agreements, courts are particularly sensitive to 
what the parties intended in agreeing to "team" -- that is, 
searching for sufficiently definite terms for enforcement 
other than the simple promise to enter into a subcontract 
at a later date -- and whether that teaming agreement was 
intended to bind the parties during the various stages of 
government contract procurement. See, e.g., Occidental 
Petroleum, 382 F. Supp. at 1057; Air Tech., 199 N.E.2d at 
547-58. 
 
The fact that the parties never finalized an implementing 
subcontract is usually not fatal to enforcing the teaming 
agreement on its own -- if the parties intended the teaming 
agreement itself to constitute a binding agreement that 
enumerated definite terms of behavior governing the parties 
during, or even after, the bidding process. See, e.g., Air 
Technology Corp., 199 N.E.2d at 547-58; Experimental 
Eng'g, 614 F.2d at 1246-47; but see W.J. Schafer Assocs., 
Inc. v. Cordant, Inc., 493 S.E.2d 512 (Va. 1997) (teaming 
agreement standing alone did not create any binding 
obligations). Such terms might include the subcontractor's 
assistance in the prime contractor's proposal in return for 
the prime contractor's delivery of an agreeable subcontract. 
See Experimental Eng'g, 614 F.2d at 1246. Or, the parties 
might promise to work exclusively with each other in 
preparing the bid for the government contract. See 
McDonnell Douglas, 705 F.2d at 1038-38. Of course, if the 
parties to a teaming agreement do not wish to create 
binding obligations before executing an ultimate 
subcontract, they need only say so. See 1 Joseph M. Perillo, 
supra, S 2.9. 
 
Pennsylvania law has not to date explicitly recognized the 
validity of teaming agreements as enforceable contracts, 
and the defendant argues that Pennsylvania law would not 
recognize such an arrangement without a finalized 
subcontract because of the absence of an essential term. 
We disagree. Pennsylvania courts have long since 
recognized that "the paramount goal of contractual 
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interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of 
the parties." Greene v. Oliver Realty, Inc. , 526 A.2d 1192, 
1194 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987) (citing Burns Mfg. Co. v. Boehm, 
356 A.2d 763, 766 (Pa. 1976)). Indeed, the omission of an 
essential term in a contract, such as price, does not vitiate 
contract formation if the parties otherwise manifested their 
mutual assent to the agreement and the terms of that 
agreement are sufficiently definite. See, e.g., Kuss Mach. 
Tool & Die Co. v. El-Tronics, Inc., 143 A.2d 38, 40 (Pa. 
1958); Greene, 526 A.2d at 1193; cf. Restatement, supra, 
S 204 ("When the parties to a bargain sufficiently defined to 
be a contract have not agreed with respect to a term which 
is essential to a determination of their rights and duties, a 
term which is reasonable in the circumstances is supplied 
by the court."). Analyzing Pennsylvania law, for example, we 
have previously concluded that a "letter of intent" between 
parties to a transaction created a "mutually binding 
obligation," even though the parties never reached a final 
agreement on the terms of the bargain. Channel Home Ctrs. 
v. Grossman, 795 F.2d 291, 298-99 (3d Cir. 1986). Given 
that the letter of intent possessed sufficient specificity as to 
the underlying transaction, the critical inquiry under 
Pennsylvania law was simply whether the parties had 
intended to be bound by the terms of such a preliminary 
agreement. Id. We conclude that Pennsylvania law would 
recognize a teaming agreement as an enforceable contract 
provided that the parties intended to be bound by the 
teaming arrangement and the agreement contains sufficient 
terms for enforcement. 
 
B. The Teaming Agreement as Contract 
 
With these principles in mind, we consider whether the 
teaming agreement itself, as expressed in the parties' 
correspondences, constitutes an enforceable contract 
notwithstanding the parties' ultimate failure to execute a 
subcontract for the Greek project. Because no party on 
appeal asserts as a defense a lack of consideration, we look 
to: (1) whether both parties manifested an intention to be 
bound by the teaming agreement; and (2) whether the 
terms of that agreement are sufficiently definite. 
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The district court concluded that the parties manifested 
their mutual assent to be bound by the terms of the 
teaming arrangement, as outlined in the various letters 
circulated between plaintiffs and defendant. Wefind 
nothing clearly erroneous with this factual finding. The 
record contains numerous correspondences by both parties 
clearly indicating their "inten[t] to team" and work 
exclusively with each other in preparation for the Greek 
RFP. App. at 1671. Defendant itself represented to the 
Greek government that plaintiffs constituted part of the 
"team" that would undertake the project under defendant's 
auspices as prime contractor. As a result, we conclude, as 
did the district court, that the plaintiffs have met their 
burden in establishing the intention to be bound by the 
terms of the teaming agreement during the negotiations for 
a subcontract to be executed by the parties. 
 
Even if plaintiffs have established evidence of the parties' 
mutual assent to be bound by the teaming agreement, that 
agreement must contain sufficiently definite terms for 
enforcement or else, as explained above, there is no basis 
for the court to fashion a suitable remedy. After a thorough 
review of the relevant correspondences, the district court 
concluded that the plaintiffs established sufficiently definite 
terms of the teaming arrangement. In particular, the 
district court held that plaintiffs had promised to assist in 
defendant's bid for the Greek RFP, introduce defendant to 
their Greek agent, and work exclusively with defendant in 
return for good faith and exclusive negotiations with 
plaintiffs toward executing a subcontract. We agree that the 
letters of intent and draft subcontracts exchanged between 
the parties clearly outline the terms of this transaction as 
an expression of the parties' intent. This is not, as 
defendant argues on appeal, nothing more than a simple 
"agreement to agree" given the specificity of the duties 
carefully described in the draft subcontracts and letters of 
intent. Nor did the parties indicate that the terms of their 
teaming agreement were subject to final execution of the 
subcontract. See Schermer v. Wilmart, 127 A. 315, 315-16 
(Pa. 1925). Thus, because the plaintiffs have successfully 
proved the elements of contract formation as applied to 
teaming agreements, we conclude that the teaming 
agreement between plaintiffs and defendant constitutes a 
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valid and enforceable contract with the terms found by the 
district court. 
 
Accordingly, to the extent that defendant's cross-appeal 
challenges the district court's finding that the teaming 
arrangement was an enforceable contract, we will affirm. 
 
III. Damages  
 
We now turn to plaintiffs' primary appeal -- that the 
district court erred in assessing nominal damages of $1. 
Plaintiffs press several arguments in their cause. First, they 
contend that the district court erred in looking to calculate 
damages with "reasonable certainty." Plaintiffs maintain 
instead that defendant must shoulder the burden of any 
uncertainty caused by its breach of contract. In the 
alternative, plaintiffs assert that they had proved damages 
with reasonable certainty. Here, plaintiffs claim that they 
should receive approximately $2.3 million in lost profits, 
which they calculate as their 35% profit margin of their 
final price quote in addition to costs and variousfinancing 
fees. Plaintiffs suggest that if this court is unwilling to 
award such an amount in expectation damages, then the 
appropriate remedy would be a remand for furtherfindings 
with respect to reasonable profits or the parties' willingness 
to negotiate the terms of the subcontract. 
 
In support of the district court's assessment of nominal 
damages, defendant emphasizes that the parties never 
agreed on the price of the contemplated subcontract. 
Because the district court could not evaluate lost profits 
without the agreed upon subcontract price, any expectation 
damages would be based solely on speculation. Defendant 
also objects to plaintiffs' request for a remand for factual 
findings with respect to an alternative measure of damages. 
It notes that plaintiffs have pursued their lost profits theory 
of damages before the district court to the exclusion of 
other possible remedies, and now they must be bound by 
that decision. We face these issues in turn. 
 
A. Theories of Contract Enforcement by 
an Award of Damages 
 
In general, contract law espouses three distinct, yet 
equally important, theories of damages to remedy a breach 
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of contract: "expectation" damages, "reliance" damages, and 
"restitution" damages. See Trosky v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 
652 A.2d 813, 817 (Pa. 1995); Restatement, supra,S 344. 
The preferred basis of contract damages seeks to protect an 
injured party's "expectation interest" -- that is, the interest 
in having the benefit of the bargain -- and accordingly 
awards damages designed to place the aggrieved in as good 
a position as would have occurred had the contract been 
performed. See Trosky, 652 A.2d at 817; Restatement, 
supra, SS 344(a), 347. Toward that end, expectation 
damages are measured by "the losses caused and gains 
prevented by defendant's breach, to the extent that are in 
excess of any savings made possible by nonperformance." 
American Air Filter Co. v. McNichol, 527 F.2d 1297, 1299 
(3d Cir. 1975) (citations omitted). 
 
While the traditional law of contract remedies implements 
the policy that goods and services should be consumed by 
the person who values them most highly, and hence the 
preference for expectation damages, other theories of 
damages provide alternative avenues for contract 
enforcement. This is especially so where an injured party is 
entitled to recover for breach of contract, but recovery 
based on traditional notions of expectation damages is 
clouded because of the uncertainty in measuring the loss in 
value to the aggrieved contracting party. See Restatement, 
supra, S 349 cmt. a; 5 Arthur L. Corbin, supra, S 1031, at 
188. Thus, where a court cannot measure lost profits with 
certainty, contract law protects an injured party's reliance 
interest by seeking to achieve the position that it would 
have obtained had the contract never been made, usually 
through the recovery of expenditures actually made in 
performance or in anticipation of performance. See DePaolo 
v. DeRomo, 31 A.2d 158, 161 (Pa. 1943); In re Kellet Aircraft 
Corp., 191 F.2d 231, 236 (3d Cir. 1951); 5 Arthur L. 
Corbin, supra, S 1031, at 188. 
 
Finally, damages under a theory of restitution provides 
an appropriate form of relief in many contract cases. Its 
objective is not the enforcement of contracts through the 
protection of an injured party's expectation or reliance 
interests, but is instead rooted in common notions of equity 
through the protection of the injured's restitution interest. 
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See Fidelity Fund, Inc. v. DiSanto, 500 A.2d 431, 438 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1985); 5 Arthur L. Corbin, supra, S 1101, at 548; 
Restatement, supra, Ch. 16, Topic 4, intro. note, at 199. 
Accordingly, restitution damages will require the party in 
breach to disgorge the benefit received by returning it to the 
party who conferred it. See Trosky, 652 A.2d at 817. 
Pennsylvania courts will look to traditional principles of 
equity, such as unjust enrichment or forfeiture, in 
considering the propriety of restitution damages. See 
DiSanto, 500 A.2d at 438-39. 
 
1. The Standard of Proof 
 
With these principles in mind, we now address plaintiffs' 
first contention on appeal -- that they need not 
demonstrate damage flowing from breach to a "reasonable 
certainty." Although mathematical certainty is not typically 
required, the general rule in Pennsylvania, as in most 
jurisdictions, is that if damages are difficult to establish, an 
injured party need only prove damages with reasonable 
certainty. See Scobell, Inc. v. Schade, 688 A.2d 715, 719 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1997); Sobers v. Shannon Optical Co., 473 
A.2d 1035, 1039 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984); see also 
Restatement, supra, S 352; 5 Arthur L. Corbin, supra, 
SS 1020, 1022. Doubts are construed against the breaching 
party. See Delahanty v. First Pennsylvania Bank, 464 A.2d 
1243, 1257 (Pa. 1983); Restatement, supra, S 342 cmt. a. 
 
"Reasonable certainty," as with most other standards of 
proof, is a difficult concept to quantify, but Pennsylvania 
courts have provided guidance as to what the term entails 
for purposes of assessing damages. At a minimum, 
reasonable certainty embraces a rough calculation that is 
not "too speculative, vague or contingent" upon some 
unknown factor. See Spang & Co. v. United States Steel 
Corp., 545 A.2d 861, 866 (Pa. 1988). Conversely, applying 
the reasonable certainty standard does not preclude an 
award of damages because of "some uncertainty as to the 
precise amount of damages incurred." Pugh v. Homes, 405 
A.2d 897, 909 (Pa. 1979). Pennsylvania jurisprudence 
governing the issue is summarized in Aiken Indus., Inc. v. 
Estate of Wilson, 383 A.2d 808 (Pa. 1978), where the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court ultimately concluded "that 
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compensation for breach of contract cannot be justly 
refused because proof of the exact amount of loss is not 
produced, for there is judicial recognition of the difficulty or 
even impossibility of the production of such proof. What the 
law does require in cases of this character is that the 
evidence shall with a fair degree of probability establish a 
basis for the assessment of damages." Id. at 812. 
 
Plaintiffs' cited authority is not to the contrary. See 
Spang & Co. v. United States Steel Corp., 545 A.2d 861 (Pa. 
1988); Delahanty v. First Pennsylvania Bank, 464 A.2d 
1243 (Pa. 1983); Pugh v. Holmes, 405 A.2d 897 (Pa. 1979); 
Standard Pipeline Coating Co. v. Solomon & Teslovich, Inc., 
496 A.2d 840 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985). None of these cases 
establish a more relaxed standard of proof than that 
required by reasonable certainty. The Restatement itself, 
which promulgates a reasonable certainty standard, states 
that "[d]amages need not be calculable with mathematical 
accuracy and are often at best approximate." Restatement, 
supra, S 352 cmt. a. Thus, we conclude that the district 
court correctly applied Pennsylvania law in attempting to 
ascertain damages with reasonable certainty. 
 
2. Damages Appropriate to the Breach of 
the Teaming Agreement 
 
Having established the necessary standard of proof to 
recover damages as a consequence to breach of contract, 
we now address whether plaintiffs have met such a burden. 
The district court held that it could not assess expectation 
damages measured in lost profits because the parties never 
agreed to a price on plaintiffs' subcontract. While the 
district court considered the possibility of restitution 
damages, it concluded that it could not place a definite 
value on the benefit realized by defendant as a result of 
plaintiffs' performance. Plaintiffs do not claim reliance 
damages on appeal, nor did the district court address that 
possibility as an alternative measure of damages. 
 
a. Expectation Damages 
 
Plaintiffs maintain on appeal that they have met their 
burden of proving expectation damages to a reasonable 
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certainty. Although courts have applied expectation 
damages to remedy the breach of a teaming agreement, see 
Air Tech., 199 N.E.2d at 548-49, we find the requisite proof 
of plaintiffs' expectation interest, measured in reasonably 
certain lost profits, lacking in this case. Even when 
discounted to reflect uncertainty, there would be absolutely 
no basis for the district court to place a value on plaintiffs' 
subcontract. As the record clearly demonstrates, the parties 
were far from agreeing on a contract price, financing fees, 
and other terms of the subcontract. Indeed, the district 
court found through ample support in the record that 
"significant obstacles" stood in the way of an agreement on 
the subcontract's price, and that the plaintiffs had not 
presented sufficient evidence that further negotiations 
would likely have proven fruitful. It is true, as plaintiffs 
note, that the Pennsylvania law of contracts allows for some 
uncertainty in calculating damages -- perhaps even a 
significant amount of uncertainty -- but a lost profits 
calculus based solely on unsubstantiated speculation and 
conjecture cannot form the basis of recovery. See Spang & 
Co., 545 A.2d at 866. Such a vague and speculative 
determination would have been necessary in this case if the 
district court assessed lost profits as damages, and 
accordingly the district court correctly declined to award 
expectation damages. See E. Allan Farnsworth, supra, 87 
Colum. L. Rev. at 264 (lost profits not appropriate with a 
breach of a preliminary agreement because there is"no way 
of knowing what the terms of the ultimate agreement would 
have been, or even whether the parties would have arrived 
at an ultimate agreement"); Brent E. Newton, supra, 91 
Colum. L. Rev. at 2028 (same). 
 
b. Restitution 
 
Notwithstanding any uncertainty in assessing lost profits 
as a measure of expectation damages, contract law does not 
preclude an otherwise appropriate remedy under a 
restitution theory of damages. This is especially the case 
where, as here, unknown variables cloud a reasonably 
certain calculation of lost profits stemming from the breach 
of the teaming agreement. See Air Tech., 199 N.E.2d at 549. 
Thus, we agree that it would be appropriate for the district 
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court to measure "the fair value of [the subcontractor's] 
contribution to [the prime contractor's] agreement," in order 
to protect the subcontractor's restitution interest. Id. 
 
As the district court properly concluded in this case, 
plaintiffs contributed valuable services to defendant's Greek 
RFP bid and significantly enhanced its chances of winning 
the project. However, the court ultimately held that"it is 
not clear how to quantify the value of those services," and 
therefore denied restitution as a measure of damages. While 
we share the district court's appreciation of the difficulties 
in measuring the benefit conferred on defendant, we believe 
the court's denial of restitution as a possible remedy 
premature without an evidentiary hearing. The district 
court, with characteristic courtesy, did invite the parties to 
further brief the issue of restitution, but it did not offer 
them an opportunity to present additional evidence that 
might shed light on the quantification of restitution 
damages. Such evidence might include the testimony of 
knowledgeable experts in the field who would testify as to 
the reasonable value of plaintiffs' technical and consulting 
services in this market of government contracting. 
Furthermore, as the plaintiffs claimed before the district 
court, defendant saved approximately $2 million by 
subcontracting with Craig and Airflow. See App. at 835. If 
this is indeed the case, the district court may then consider 
how much of that savings reflected preliminary services 
rendered by the plaintiffs that ultimately benefitted the 
Craig proposal. Thus, given the possibility of the plaintiffs' 
proving reasonable restitution damages, we will vacate the 
district court's entry of judgment against defendant for 
nominal damages in the amount of $1. In arriving at this 
conclusion to remand, we believe that equitable 
considerations must predominate over a parochial 
approach to the number of issues properly before us. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district 
court will be affirmed except as to the award of nominal 
damages. The entry of judgment against defendant in the 
amount of $1 will be vacated and the matter remanded to 
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the district court in accordance with the directions in this 
opinion. 
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